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David Silverman 
Sensorimotor Theory and the 
Problems of Consciousness 
Abstract: The sensorimotor theory is an influential account of per-
ception and phenomenal qualities that builds, in an empirically 
supported way, on the basic claim that conscious experience is best 
construed as an attribute of the whole embodied agent’s skill-driven 
interactions with the environment. This paper, in addition to situating 
the theory as a response to certain well-known problems of conscious-
ness, develops a sensorimotor account of why we are perceptually 
conscious rather than not. 
1. 
The prevailing scientific understanding of the mind takes it that con-
scious phenomena such as perception and thought, though incom-
pletely understood, are things that happen in the brain. The problem is 
that no intelligible connection has been made between mere brain 
activity and the conscious experience, seemingly quite different in 
character, it is believed to constitute. This difficulty is recognized by 
Block, who says: 
All scientifically oriented accounts should agree that consciousness is in 
some sense based in the brain; once this fact is accepted, the problem 
arises of why the brain basis of this experience is the basis of this one 
rather than another one or none, and it becomes obvious that nothing 
now known gives a hint of an explanation. (Block, 2009, p. 1113) 
While Block thinks the difficulty a brute fact given current under-
standing, others have reasoned that, since consciousness cannot be 
intelligibly identified with neural activity, it cannot be neural activity. 
This line of reasoning is familiar from Chalmers (1996), who rejects 
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 190 D.  SILVERMAN 
physicalism altogether, although his alternative, dualism, does nothing 
to make consciousness more naturalistically explicable. 
The sensorimotor approach makes use of the same line of reasoning, 
but reaches a quite different conclusion to Chalmers. Endorsing Ryle’s 
(1949) view that the conception of the conscious mind as a ‘ghost in 
the machine’ generated by the brain is a category mistake, the 
approach claims that conscious experience is not something that 
happens in the brain, but something we do. Building on this principle, 
the approach’s proponents have developed a contemporary view 
which promises to account for the phenomenal qualities of perceptual 
consciousness by appeal to various ways in which embodied agents 
skilfully interact with the environment. 
One early example of an explanatory reward concerns the visual 
feeling of being embedded within a large and richly detailed scene. 
Experiments on ‘change blindness’ have found that subjects often fail 
to report seeing dramatic changes taking place in full view (e.g. 
O’Regan, Rensink and Clark, 1999), indicating that visual experience 
is likely not to involve an expansive and uniformly detailed inner 
model. The challenge, given this result, is to explain why visual 
experience nonetheless feels rich and expansive. Adopting a sensori-
motor perspective, O’Regan (1992) and Noë (2002; 2004), among 
others, meet this challenge by claiming that visual experience is not 
constituted by the activation of an inner model but by skill-driven, 
temporally-extended exploration incorporating bodily movements 
such as saccades. 
Pursuing the idea that we can make the phenomenal features of per-
ceptual consciousness intelligible by identifying them with properties 
of bodily interaction, O’Regan and Noë (2001) make the broader 
suggestion that we can use sensorimotor patterns to explain in a near 
comprehensive way what distinguishes the varying phenomenal 
qualities of perceptual consciousness from one another. To this end, 
the authors propose that the specific qualities of experiencing, for 
example various colours and sounds, and more broadly the qualities of 
vision, audition, and other modalities, should be identified with sets of 
‘sensorimotor contingencies’, laws of dependence between movement 
by perceiver or object and changes in sensory stimulation (see also 
Noë, 2004; O’Regan, 2011). The appeal of this proposal lies partly in 
its very great explanatory potential, promising as it does a systematic 
framework with which to make the qualities of consciousness scien-
tifically tractable, and in turn a strong foundation for challenging the 
idea that they are fundamentally mysterious ‘qualia’. 
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There are also compelling reasons to suspect that the sensorimotor 
contingency proposal is correct. One is an informal analogy. The 
softness one experiences when squeezing a sponge resides, quite 
unmysteriously, in its yielding easily to the touch, a sensorimotor law 
of just the sort that the sensorimotor framework appeals to (Myin, 
2003). By analogy, it is possible that other kinds of experiential 
quality also reside in such laws, with the relative inscrutability of 
some qualities, such as the looks of colours, resulting from the fact 
that the corresponding laws are much more complex (O’Regan, 2011). 
And, in the case of colour qualities, the approach has received a 
measure of empirical support, O’Regan and colleagues having found 
that the most universally adopted colour categories (Berlin and Kay, 
1969) correspond to the surfaces that yield the most easily described 
patterns of sensorimotor contingency (Philipona and O’Regan, 2006; 
Witzel, Cinotti and O’Regan, 2015), and therefore that we can explain 
what distinguishes these colour qualities from others if we identify 
them with sensorimotor laws. 
These examples illustrate the progress that the sensorimotor 
approach is making toward accounting for the phenomenal character 
of perceptual consciousness. In light of the overarching limitations of 
identifying consciousness and its properties with brain activity, the 
explanatory returns the approach has started to bring in this domain 
give support to the still broader thesis that the conscious mind is in 
general best understood as an attribute of the whole embodied 
subject’s ways of skilfully interacting with the environment. A further 
task, which recent work by O’Regan has begun, is to apply the 
sensorimotor perspective to the question of why we are perceptually 
conscious at all (O’Regan, 2011; 2016; Degenaar and O’Regan, 
2015a,b). The bet is that with careful attention it will be possible to 
identify principled differences between conscious and unconscious 
ways of interacting, and use these to account for the existence of 
consciousness. 
One task this paper will take up is to explicitly situate the sensori-
motor approach as a response to certain well-known problems of con-
sciousness as framed by analytic philosophy of mind. §2 identifies 
four different problems of consciousness, distinguishing the ‘hard’ 
from the ‘easy’, and the ‘comparative’ (why an experience has one 
phenomenal quality rather than another) from the ‘absolute’ (why it is 
conscious at all). §3 explains why conscious experiences are in 
general likely to be more usefully identified with skill-driven bodily 
interactions than brain states or internal representations, and §4 
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explains in a little more detail how the appeal to sensorimotor con-
tingencies helps solve the comparative problems. With the approach 
thus situated, the paper will offer a sensorimotor approach to the 
question of why conscious perceivers are conscious rather than not. §5 
proposes a principled difference between conscious and unconscious 
ways of perceptually interacting with the environment. §6 attempts to 
overcome potential objections that the kinds of interaction I propose 
constitute consciousness are in fact either unnecessary or insufficient 
for it. 
2. 
Let’s remind ourselves of the problems that need to be solved in order 
to exhaustively naturalize consciousness. First, there are the ‘compara-
tive’ and ‘absolute’ problems (Hurley and Noë, 2003). The compara-
tive problem is that of explaining why a conscious experience, for 
example seeing the colour red, has one phenomenal quality rather than 
another. The absolute problem is that of explaining why there is any 
phenomenal quality rather than none. 
There are also the ‘hard’ and ‘easy’ problems (from Chalmers, 
1996, though my presentation of them will differ slightly from his). 
While not to be confused with the absolute/comparative distinction, 
the hard/easy distinction is in its own way also a distinction between 
the absolute and the comparative, since the easy problem requires us 
to explain, in comparative fashion, why one physical thing rather than 
another is conscious, and the hard problem requires us to explain, in 
absolute fashion, how physical things can be conscious at all. 
Solving the hard problem entails dissolving the ‘zombie’ intuition, 
which holds that any physical feature we take to be the substrate of 
consciousness could in principle exist in the absence of consciousness. 
Solving the easy problem entails, supposing that consciousness is 
indeed physical, explaining which physical features constitute (e.g.) a 
conscious mind, or a conscious experience of the colour red. Though 
it does not require us to avoid the zombie intuition, the easy problem 
poses a considerable challenge, not least because it requires us to 
explain why one physical feature is conscious while another is not in a 
principled way. Mere descriptions of the physical (e.g. neural) 
correlates of consciousness will not suffice to solve even the easy 
problem unless they are accompanied by a suitably principled 
explanation for why these features are the correlates and not some 
others. 
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Though literature on consciousness often distinguishes the hard 
from the easy problem, on the one hand, and the absolute from the 
comparative problem, on the other, the two distinctions are not usually 
laid out explicitly all at once. In fact, it is useful to consider that the 
distinctions intersect, meaning that to explain consciousness fully we 
must solve four problems: (i) hard-absolute — how consciousness can 
in general be physical, (ii) hard-comparative — how e.g. the look of 
red can be physical, (iii) easy-absolute — why consciousness in 
general has one physical substrate rather than another, and (iv) easy-
comparative — why e.g. the look of red has one physical substrate 
rather than another. 
The sensorimotor approach, as I shall understand it, addresses the 
easy and hard problems in a bottom-up manner, attempting initially to 
solve the easy problems, such that consciousness and its qualities are 
intelligible and tractable from a scientific perspective. Its solution to 
the hard problems will involve further argumentative steps intended to 
show that this solution is sufficient to account exhaustively for 
consciousness. 
3. 
Before we proceed, it will be necessary to explain in some further 
detail why appealing to the possession and exercise of sensorimotor 
skills offers a more promising way to explain consciousness than brain 
activity. O’Regan and Noë (2001) emphasize the explanatory limita-
tions, touched on in the last section, of neural correlates of conscious-
ness (NCCs). They argue that whatever kinds of brain activity we may 
find are correlated with consciousness — for example, coherent 
oscillations at particular frequencies (e.g. Crick and Koch, 1990) or 
the quantum properties of neurons (e.g. Penrose, 1994) — there will 
always remain a question of why that neural feature gives rise to con-
sciousness (with a particular phenomenal quality, or at all). This 
means that descriptions of NCCs are not even enough to solve the 
easy problems of consciousness, as I have characterized them, let 
alone the hard problems. 
The sensorimotor approach, it should be acknowledged, is not the 
only available attempt to make the link between consciousness and its 
physical substrate more intelligible than NCCs can. There is a large 
body of relatively mainstream thinking which, rather than appealing 
directly to brain activity, appeals to representations that are realized 
by the brain and said to yield conscious experience by virtue of their 
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contents and in some accounts functional roles (e.g. Tye, 2000). 
Representationalism, as this approach is known, promises to make the 
existence and particular phenomenal character of conscious experi-
ences naturalistically explicable while staying faithful to the orthodox 
cognitive scientific construal of the mind/brain as an information pro-
cessing device, and, at least in a fashion, to the conception of con-
scious experience as a kind of neural activity. 
As I shall understand it, the sensorimotor approach — in line with 
other forms of ‘enactivism’ (e.g. Thompson, 2007) — denies that we 
should identify conscious perception and other kinds of experience 
with internal representation, on pain of failing to adequately naturalize 
consciousness. The reason is this. Hutto and Myin (2013) have shown 
that the leading attempts to naturalize neurally-borne content (i.e. truth 
conditions) are unconvincing, because they depend on the idea that 
covariance between the brain and outside world is sufficient, under 
certain conditions, for content, whereas nothing has been done to 
establish that this is so. Millikan (1989), for example, attempts to 
naturalize content by appealing to the proper function brains have of 
possessing and making appropriate use of covariance relations. The 
problem is that even the appeal to proper function merely shows that 
brains have the function of exploiting patterns of covariance with the 
environment and does not establish that they bear content about it. 
I will not argue, as Hutto and Myin (2013) do, that content should 
never play any role in explaining perception and action. Consider that 
many prominent endorsers of orthodox (i.e. content-involving) cog-
nitive science suggest that content does not need to be naturalized but 
exists by stipulation, their having defined content as a kind of co-
variance (e.g. Rupert, 2011). This is often accompanied by the idea 
that content exists as an explanatory fiction, e.g. a metaphor, of one 
kind or another (McDowell, 1994; Sprevak, 2013; Egan, 2014). 
Leaving to one side Hutto and Myin’s (2013) further claim that con-
tent is not needed to explain basic perception and action, the avail-
ability of these strategies suggests that content is, in principle at least, 
admissible as a theoretical tool for modelling the physical processes 
that produce bodily behaviour. 
The lesson I wish to draw is that content, so far as has been estab-
lished, does not exist in any more metaphysically-demanding sense 
than as stipulation or explanatory fiction. This view is not especially 
left-field given the number of endorsers of orthodox cognitive science 
that present it as such a fiction. Consciousness, by contrast, exists 
independently of any stipulations or explanatory fictions offered. 
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Moreover, consciousness exists for the conscious subject, whereas 
content as a stipulation or explanatory fiction exists at most relative to 
a theoretical model. Since consciousness has properties that content 
does not, consciousness cannot be identical to content. 
Bodily skills, in contrast with content, are readily observable 
abilities to carry out various kinds of bodily movement. There is there-
fore good reason to give serious consideration to the possibility that 
appealing in various ways to skills and skill-driven bodily interactions 
can help solve the four problems of consciousness. 
4. 
We will continue by examining the sensorimotor approach’s response 
to the comparative problems (easy and hard). The approach claims 
that to perceive is to carry out bodily action that is perceptually-
guided. Bodily action is perceptually-guided just in case it instantiates 
‘mastery’ of sensorimotor contingencies (SMCs), the ways that 
sensory inputs are disposed to change as a result of movement by the 
perceiver or objects. Mastery can be glossed either as implicit 
knowledge of SMCs or merely as adaptedness to them. Action, as I 
intend, is purposeful doing, and should be read in the present paper as 
including cases where you are merely disposed to move your body, 
even if you do not actually do so.1 
Perception need not be conscious (a point we will return to shortly), 
but where it does occur consciously its particular phenomenal 
qualities are, O’Regan and Noë (2001) claim, constituted by the SMCs 
which are the objects of the mastery. The phenomenal quality of a 
sense modality (such as vision) is identical to the SMCs determined 
by the physical properties of the sense organs (in this case eyes), and 
the phenomenal qualities featured within modalities, e.g. the quality of 
seeing the colour red, are identical to SMCs determined jointly by the 
sense organs and external objects (in this case, the eyes and the 
surface properties distinctive of red objects).2 
                                                          
1  I offer a more detailed account of sensorimotor mastery in Silverman (2017). 
2  Autopoietic enactivists such as Thompson (2007) claim that biological interactions 
instantiating autopoiesis and/or autonomy are pre-requisites for consciousness or 
genuine perception, a claim denied by Degenaar and O’Regan (2015b) who claim that 
distinctively perceptual interactions suffice for perception. This paper will not take a 
stance on this issue. Note, however, that even if biological interactions are pre-requisites 
for perception and consciousness, as Noë (2004) argues, we will still need to explain 
what distinguishes one phenomenal quality from another, and conscious from 
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Using the looks of colours as a case study, let’s see how this 
proposal helps solve the easy-comparative problem. Phenomenal 
similarities and differences between colours can be quantified on the 
basis of verbally reported judgments of phenomenal difference and 
similarity, and the degrees of reported similarity and difference plotted 
diagrammatically as a ‘colour space’ (Palmer, 1999). Differences 
between the varying sets of SMCs that obtain when we experience 
various colour qualities can also in principle be quantified using 
mathematical laws, and plotted in what we could call SMC space, 
which we hypothesize will be isomorphic to quality space. To explain 
in a principled way why the phenomenal quality associated with red 
supervenes on one set of SMCs rather than another, we can appeal to 
the fact that the isomorphism would no longer obtain if the quality 
occupied a different point in SMC space. 
One potential objection is that colour phenomenology could 
conceivably be inverted so that the isomorphism between colour space 
and SMC space is preserved but colour phenomenology changes. If 
this were a possibility, we would have no principled explanation of 
why the phenomenal quality of a colour such as red supervenes on one 
set of SMCs rather than the inverse set. Palmer, however, has argued 
convincingly that colour space is not symmetrical, meaning it is not 
possible for colour phenomenology to be inverted while degrees of 
reported phenomenal difference and similarity are preserved (ibid.). 
The problem nonetheless remains, Palmer suggests, that it is possi-
ble to conceive of all colour qualities being uniformly different, for 
example all seeming darker than they do, without affecting the differ-
ences and similarities charted in colour space. This means the iso-
morphism between colour space and SMC space cannot explain why 
all colours do not seem, for instance, uniformly darker. This threatens 
to compromise the sensorimotor account’s ability to comprehensively 
overcome the easy-comparative problem. 
Moreover, even if the account just given were sufficient to solve the 
easy-comparative problem, it appears insufficient to solve the hard-
comparative problem. The intuition motivating the latter problem, 
illustrated by Jackson’s (1982) example of a colour scientist who has 
never seen colour, is that even knowing everything that could be 
known about the physical features (e.g. SMCs) upon which 
                                                                                                                  
unconscious perception — work that may be done by appeal to the non-biological kinds 
of interaction I describe in this paper. 
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phenomenal qualities supervene would not suffice to know what 
phenomenal qualities are like — suggesting, Jackson once claimed, 
that phenomenal qualities are non-physical. 
The hard-comparative problem and the remaining obstacle to 
solving the easy-comparative problem can be addressed at once if we 
take it that the experience of a colour is, as Pettit (2003) proposes, 
simply the experience of being able to discriminate a colour appro-
priately from other colours. Noë (2004, p. 139), endorsing this pro-
posal, observes that it does not require us to endorse a crude and 
implausible kind of behaviourism given the fineness of the discrimina-
tions required. It is also worth emphasizing that the ability to discrimi-
nate one colour from another needs to persist through changes to the 
way that the perceived surfaces are illuminated from the perceiver’s 
point of view, and this illumination changes as the perceiver moves 
her body. This means that the abilities in question are not abilities to 
discriminate just any property, as a crudely behaviourist account 
might suggest, but are necessarily abilities to discriminate obtaining 
sensorimotor laws. 
5. 
O’Regan (2011) acknowledges that sensorimotor theory’s explanation 
for the phenomenal character of perception, though sufficient to 
address the comparative problem, is insufficient to solve the absolute 
problem. This is because you could exercise mastery of SMCs (and 
hence perceive) without being conscious. O’Regan uses the old 
example of an absent-minded driver who, while attending to con-
versation with her passenger, is unconscious of the road traffic she 
successfully negotiates. On the basis that this is a plausible account of 
what happens during absent-minded driving, O’Regan treats the prob-
lem of explaining consciousness as the problem of explaining what 
distinguishes the absent-minded driver from one who is aware of the 
road. His answer is that perceptual consciousness requires, in addition 
to the ability to perceive and act, an appropriate kind of cognitive 
access, in particular the ability to think about and communicate what 
one sees. 
Attempts to identify phenomenal consciousness with cognition are 
in general subject to certain well-known objections, for instance the 
possibility of zombies that engage in the relevant kind of cognition 
without being conscious (Chalmers, 1996) and the possibility that 
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phenomenal consciousness sometimes occurs in the absence of 
cognitive access (Block, 1995). I will come back to these in §6. 
My focus in the present section and its associated subsections (§5.1–
5.4) will be on developing O’Regan’s proposal in a way that identifies 
consciousness with the embodied subject’s skill-driven interactions. In 
§5.1 I will give a more detailed summary of O’Regan’s response to 
the absolute problem, which I will treat merely as a response to the 
easy-absolute problem. In §5.2 I will identify two competing con-
ceptions of cognitive access, one which is incompatible with the claim 
that consciousness depends on interactive abilities, and one of which 
is compatible with this claim, and in §5.3 I will defend a version of the 
latter. In §5.4 I will make some suggestions about the kinds of skill-
driven interaction that cognitive access consists of.3 
5.1. 
Elaborating on his claim that perception takes place consciously 
where we have cognitive access to what we perceive, O’Regan (2011) 
states that this involves our being poised to make use of our mastery 
of SMCs for the purpose of cognitive activities such as thought, 
communication, and action planning. He adds that consciousness also 
requires a psychological ‘self’, given that one feature of conscious 
thoughts and sensations is that they always belong to us as unified 
subjects. 
Although important disanalogies between sensorimotor and repre-
sentationalist theories of consciousness will shortly emerge, it will 
help situate O’Regan’s account if we draw some comparisons with 
representationalist theories. The account might be construed as 
analogous to Tye’s (2000) PANIC theory, which claims that mental 
(e.g. perceptual) representations are conscious when they are, among 
other things, poised to enter into belief-formation. O’Regan actually 
draws a tentative parallel between his account and dispositionalist 
higher-order thought (HOT) theories (e.g. Carruthers, 1996), which 
claim that a perceptual state is conscious when one is poised to have 
the higher-order thought that one is in the perceptual state. 
The key feature distinguishing HOT from a first-order theory like 
Tye’s is that one must have cognitive access not only to the content of 
                                                          
3  This paper focuses on perceptual consciousness. By so doing, it aims to explain a form 
(arguably the paradigmatic form) of phenomenal consciousness. 
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the percept, but to the fact that one has this perceptual content. 
O’Regan’s claim that consciousness requires a self could be inter-
preted as meaning that, in order to be conscious of a red car that you 
see, you must not only be poised to think about the car, but also be 
poised to have the thought ‘I see a red car’. This would make sense of 
the supposed analogy between O’Regan’s account and a dispo-
sitionalist HOT account. 
However, there is no immediately apparent reason to think that the 
driver conscious of a red car in front is necessarily poised to have the 
thought that she herself sees a red car in front of her. On the face of it, 
merely being ready to think about the red car in front is sufficient to 
entail that she is not looking at the car in an absent-minded way and 
therefore that she sees it consciously. I will take it, therefore, that if 
the ability to ascribe one’s own mental states to oneself as a subject is 
a pre-requisite for perceptual consciousness, this is only because it is a 
pre-requisite for perceiving (see Rowlands, 2016, who argues that 
selfhood is implied by sensorimotor mastery) or thinking (e.g. Kant, 
1787/1998) rather than because it is a special feature of consciousness. 
The sensorimotor account as I shall understand it is more closely 
analogous to Tye’s theory than the HOT account, requiring merely 
that you have an appropriate kind of cognitive access to what you see 
— though in the sensorimotor account, like HOT, this cognitive 
access is to be put to use in thought and communication, which may 
not be the same as belief-formation. 
Since it identifies phenomenal consciousness with having cognitive 
access to otherwise unconscious mental activities such as perception, 
the sensorimotor account — in common with representationalist pro-
posals — identifies phenomenal consciousness with a variety of what 
Block (1995) calls access consciousness. Whereas Block is famous for 
denying that access consciousness is necessary for phenomenal con-
sciousness, even he allows that having or making use of cognitive 
access is constitutive of a kind of consciousness. If Block is mistaken 
in claiming that phenomenal consciousness can exist without access 
consciousness, we may freely assume that phenomenal consciousness 
just is a certain kind of access consciousness. 
5.2. 
Let’s examine a crucial distinction, which O’Regan overlooks, 
between what is usually meant by ‘cognitive access’ and what propo-
nents of the sensorimotor theory ought to mean by it. Consider, once 
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more, O’Regan’s claim that perception takes place consciously just in 
case a subject has cognitive access to her sensorimotor mastery and is 
thereby poised to make use of it for the purpose of ‘judgments, 
reasoning, planning and communication’ (2011, p. 182). We can 
identify two competing ways of understanding what is meant by 
‘cognitive access’ here, and which we choose will have a dramatic 
bearing on how we understand the thesis. 
On one understanding (CA1), cognitive access is the accessibility of 
an internal representation to the brain’s cognitive machinery. This 
may consist, for example, of the representation’s being stored in 
working memory and consequently available for use by further pro-
cesses. Given that it uses subpersonal vocabulary, the conception is 
committed to a particular understanding of the subpersonal machinery 
that underlies thought and action, namely one that involves the 
manipulation of neurally-realized representations. In cases where 
mental states such as memories and thoughts are rightly attributed to 
the person and not just the brain, it takes them to consist simply of 
being in corresponding neurally-realized subpersonal states. 
On an alternative understanding (CA2), cognitive access is a 
personal-level (or agent-level) phenomenon constituted by the sub-
ject’s readiness to have certain thoughts, plan and carry out certain 
actions, and so forth. It may include, for example, the readiness to 
have a thought about what one sees. The conception is neutral about 
what it is to think, plan, and communicate, and is not committed to 
any particular understanding of the subpersonal processes that under-
lie these activities. 
CA1 would cement a revisionistic reading of the sensorimotor 
approach under which it is a version of representationalism (e.g. Seth, 
2014; see also, Silverman, 2017). However, this would be contrary to 
what I have argued are the proper motivations of the sensorimotor 
approach, which preclude identifying consciousness with the deploy-
ment of content-bearing neural states. The sensorimotor theory should 
therefore endorse CA2. This will leave us free to understand the 
relevant capacities for thought and communication to consist of 
capacities for embodied interaction with the environment. 
Before we continue, it is worth examining what philosophers 
usually mean by cognitive access: this will help underline the need — 
unrecognized by O’Regan (2011) — to explicitly distinguish the 
sensorimotor theory’s understanding of cognitive access from the 
more typical understanding, and will also help ensure we do justice in 
our construal of cognitive access to the considerations that 
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legitimately motivate this more usual view. Let’s begin with Block, 
who says: 
I think that [verbal] report is a good first approximation to access 
consciousness. One important reason it’s not adequate is that animals 
have access consciousness. And you know by and large, they can’t 
report. So it’s the extent to which a phenomenal state is available to 
cognitive machinery. And so a mouse or a dog or a cat can be access 
conscious of a smell or something they see. And then a representation is 
sent to their machinery of reasoning and deciding, even if they can’t 
report it. (Block, 2015) 
This shows that Block construes cognitive access as the availability of 
internal representations to cognitive machinery — by which he means, 
it is safe to say, wholly neural machinery. This demonstrates his 
commitment to CA1. It also appears to suggest that there are cases in 
which even access consciousness (let alone the consciousness he 
alleges occurs without cognitive access) cannot even in principle be 
identifiably manifested in behaviour. The purported advantage of this 
view is that it accounts for cognitive access without appealing to 
behaviours, in particular verbal report, which animals may lack. 
However, this apparent advantage comes at a cost. Degenaar and 
O’Regan (2015b) suggest that talk of mental states which cannot be 
recognizably manifested in behaviour is incoherent on the verifica-
tionist grounds that we cannot coherently talk about entities that by 
nature cannot be identified empirically. Without needing to rely on 
verificationism, Cohen and Dennett (2011) argue compellingly that it 
is not scientifically respectable to posit varieties of consciousness that 
cannot sometimes be evidenced by behaviour. 
Cohen and Dennett share, all the same, Block’s aim of accounting 
for the consciousness of subjects who cannot express their mental 
states in their behaviour, this time offering the example of patients 
with locked-in syndrome who are conscious despite being notionally 
completely unable to move their bodies. With this in mind, the authors 
identify access consciousness, like Block, with the use of neurally-
realized, functionally-defined faculties such as attention and working 
memory — specifying, for the sake of scientific respectability, that the 
functions must sometimes be evidenced by appropriate behaviours 
such as verbal reports in subjects who are not paralysed. 
Cohen and Dennett’s position is most plausibly read as suggesting 
that the link between the functionally-defined faculties such as 
working memory which constitute cognitive access and the potential 
bodily behaviours they are associated with is causal rather than 
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constitutive, with the behaviours serving only as empirical evidence 
that the functions are being realized. This suggests that they too 
endorse CA1. 
The problem with CA1 is that it prevents us from adequately 
explaining what the faculties that constitute cognitive access, let’s say 
attention and working memory, actually consist of. Since we are 
aiming to identify cognitive access with consciousness, we cannot 
identify the faculties with content-bearing neural states, given the 
prohibition (set out in §3) on identifying consciousness with such 
states. Even if, for the sake of argument, we ignored this prohibition 
and did identify the faculties with neurally-borne content, this would 
not circumvent the non-trivial task of identifying the behavioural 
criteria which Cohen and Dennett themselves argue are needed in 
order to ascribe access consciousness to a subject. 
With these points in mind, I suggest that, endorsing CA2, we 
identify cognitive access with readiness to have certain thoughts or 
communicate certain information. To explain what this readiness 
involves, we must secure a suitably tight conceptual link between 
cognitive access and interactive capacities, while also accounting for 
the cognitive access enjoyed by subjects who do not have the ability to 
perform bodily actions. 
5.3. 
Keeping in mind the considerations just raised, I suggest identifying 
readiness to think and communicate with dispositions to exercise 
capacities for appropriate kinds of embodied interaction. A capacity, 
unlike a mere disposition, is something a subject can choose whether 
or not to exercise. So I am not identifying cognition, behaviour-
istically, with mere conditioned responses. The appeal, on the other 
hand, to dispositions serves two purposes. First, cognitive access is a 
dispositional notion. It does not require that we think about or 
communicate what we see, merely that we are poised to think about or 
communicate what we see. Second, the notional completely paralysed 
locked-in patient, strictly speaking, lacks the capacity to carry out any 
bodily actions. Nonetheless, if no longer being paralysed would cause 
her to have a capacity, she is disposed to possess this capacity, and 
when she so chooses will be disposed to exercise it. 
On the view I am suggesting, there is thus a logical dependence 
between consciousness and potential bodily interaction, yet we can 
accommodate cases such as the locked-in patient where no deliberate 
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bodily movement takes place. A locked-in patient, one can reasonably 
hypothesize, is conscious because she is suitably disposed to perform 
relevant actions — for example, verbally reporting what she sees — 
even though she is prevented from actually performing them. 
It might be objected that dead (and therefore unconscious) people 
are also disposed to exercise capacities like these because they would 
exercise them if they were, among other things, alive. To avoid this 
reductio, we must be careful to distinguish between having a 
disposition which cannot be activated (e.g. because of paralysis) and 
lacking the relevant disposition entirely (e.g. because you are dead). 
There is nothing to stop us making a principled distinction between 
these two cases by appealing, for example, to the presence or absence 
of appropriate internal (e.g. neural) activity. 
Recall that we can neither identify consciousness with mere brain 
activity, on pain of failing to explain it, nor with internally-borne 
content, given that content, unlike consciousness, can only exist so far 
as has been established relative to a theoretical model and not for the 
subject. Since we are proposing to identify consciousness with 
cognitive access, we cannot identify cognitive access with contents or 
brain activity. 
This does not prevent us from appealing to neural properties, 
including content if construed as an explanatory fiction, to license the 
claim that someone possesses a relevant disposition. The locked-in 
patient can intelligibly be understood to have relevant dispositions by 
virtue of having, for example, neural or bodily states that are such as 
to ground the relevant dispositions, and therefore to enable the 
behaviours to occur in the event that nothing prevents them from 
occurring. Similarly, we can appeal to facts about the brain, including 
neurally-borne content understood as an explanatory fiction, to 
explain how the relevant dispositions are enabled subpersonally. 
An important consequence of the explanatory limitations of appeals 
to content and internal states is that appealing to them will only be 
useful in so far as it helps explain how the relevant kinds of bodily 
interaction are produced, and we cannot consider which kinds of 
internal state (including representation) help enable the relevant bodily 
interactions until we have an idea about what those interactions are. 
We should, moreover, be open to the possibility that non-representa-
tional and/or environmental features play relevant enabling roles in 
addition to or in place of internal representation — making note of the 
fact that sensorimotor theorists (e.g. Hurley, 1998) often talk about 
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interaction rather than mere behaviour to underline the ongoing role 
played by the outside environment in shaping the relevant activity. 
5.4. 
Though conscious and unconscious kinds of perception draw 
respectively on different parts of the brain, and perhaps on different 
modules and representational vehicles, we are not appealing to facts 
about cognitive architecture to explain what distinguishes them. 
Instead, we are taking them to be differing ways in which the whole 
embodied subject interacts (or is disposed to interact) with the 
environment. This means that conscious perceptual interaction should 
be viewed as a transformed version of unconscious perceptual inter-
action rather than a distinct process running in parallel. It is an activity 
in which the capacity for unconscious perceptually-guided action is 
integrated with further capacities for thought or intelligence. 
Let’s consider what this transformed capacity might actually be. We 
were acquainted earlier with the most unambiguous example of a 
perceptually conscious subject, namely one who is ready to verbally 
report what she sees. Given that we are proposing to identify the 
disposition to verbally report what you see with consciousness rather 
than merely regarding verbal report as evidence that consciousness is 
occurring, it would be inappropriate to consider verbal report just a 
matter of making appropriate noises. Consider that some chess-
playing computers, for example, have the ability to announce the 
moves they are making, but this does not entail that they understand or 
are conscious of what they are doing. This is a basic example of the 
problem identified by Searle (1980), whose thought experiment 
featuring a system that manipulates symbols syntactically without 
understanding their meaning illustrates the difficulty of distinguishing 
genuine linguistic understanding from a mere simulation merely on 
the basis of an individual’s internal states or solitary behaviour. 
What we need is an account of the interactive capacities that consti-
tute genuine linguistic understanding. Such an account is offered by 
Maturana and Varela (1987), who identify meaningful language use 
with a temporally-extended and socially-embedded activity they call 
‘languaging’. Communication, as those authors understand it, is the 
non-meaningful coordination of behaviour between organisms (we 
might say ‘agents’ since nothing in their account requires that only 
living beings communicate). Communication occurs ‘in the linguistic 
domain’, and is therefore proto-linguistic, where the vocalizations or 
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gestures, etc. used to coordinate behaviour are both learnt and arbi-
trarily selected, i.e. by social convention as with Peirce’s ‘symbols’ 
(1857–1866/1982). Meaningful communication, i.e. language, occurs, 
the authors finally propose, where communication in the linguistic 
domain takes place recursively, meaning that the way a given 
utterance is used by a community evolves over time, being further 
shaped with each use. 
Meaning itself is on this account an essentially social phenomenon. 
Thought, as Villalobos (2014) explains in an account based on 
Maturana’s, is dependent on languaging, being the covert deployment 
of a transformed and truncated version of natural language. Although 
thinking does not require bodily interaction in the short term, the 
account implies that thought can be explained by reference to the 
ways the agent (including her internal states such as brain states) 
drives and is driven in the longer term by linguistic communication, 
and therefore can itself be understood as an essentially embodied and 
socially embedded interactive capacity. This conception of thought 
avoids the failure of intelligibility that arises if we attempt to identify 
consciousness with brain states alone. 
By combining this account of meaningful language and thought 
with the account of perceptual consciousness presently under con-
sideration, we can hypothesize that perceptual consciousness occurs 
where the subject exercises sensorimotor mastery in perceptually-
guided interaction, and is ready either to coordinate this action with 
the action of another by linguistically communicating the SMCs 
mastered in the way described by Maturana and Varela (verbal report) 
or to perform an internally-realized extension of the same interactive 
behaviour (thought). 
Because the linguistic interactions described by Maturana and 
Varela are qualitatively distinct from the perceptual interactions 
described by the sensorimotor account, the proposal offers a qualita-
tive distinction between conscious and unconscious capacities, at the 
same time tracking a real difference between cases of conscious and 
absent-minded driving. In so doing, the proposal does justice to the 
suggestion made by higher-order thought theories that perception 
occurs consciously where one is ready to think about one’s perceptual 
states (reflecting in particular Carruthers’, 1996, approach, in which 
the thoughts in question depend on language). 
The advantage of this account is that it offers a robust criterion for 
genuine linguistic understanding, and so thoughtfulness, without 
appealing to any spooky neural or biological properties. While we 
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should not attribute understanding to just any machine that can issue 
sounds that resemble words we recognize, we must have behavioural 
criteria for linguistic understanding in order to ascribe it to humans, 
animals, and, one might imagine, extra-terrestrial beings — consider-
ing how interesting it might be in this latter case to know whether they 
understood what they communicated. Learning to communicate using 
arbitrarily chosen utterances, and doing so recursively among a 
community of similar language users, is a plausible candidate for such 
a criterion. If it is the right one, then it is hard to see what value there 
would be to looking inside the brain for the source of meaning. 
A limitation with this proposal is that it fails to explain how non-
linguistic creatures could be conscious. Adopting a pluralistic under-
standing of perceptual consciousness, we need not rule out the possi-
bility that non-linguistic creatures sometimes engage in a different 
variety of conscious perception by virtue of integrating their capacities 
for perceptual interaction with non-linguistic cognitive capacities. In 
particular, we may appeal to the phenomenon of cognitive control: the 
endogenous control of attention, carried out for purposes such as long-
range action-planning. Cognitive control is usually understood to be 
responsible for the feeling that an action is volitional. In so far as such 
an action is perceptually-guided, we can hypothesize that cognitive 
control also makes the associated percept conscious. 
Empirical work on the pre-motor theory of attention (see, for 
example, Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2010) has suggested that the neural 
mechanisms that underlie spatial attention are the same as those that 
underlie motor planning rather than distinct mechanisms as tradition-
ally thought, with covert rather than overt attention corresponding to 
weak activations in those areas. This is consistent with my claim that 
cognitive access consists of the exercise, or disposition to exercise, 
capacities for bodily movement. Recent work by Clark, Schumann 
and Mostofsky (2015) has suggested that cognitive control, in particu-
lar, is plausibly a bodily skill, noting that interventions such as mind-
ful movement training targeted at improving motor control also bring 
improvements in cognitive control. 
Taking it, therefore, that cognitive control is plausibly a bodily 
capacity, we must explain what kinds of bodily interaction it is a 
capacity for. Tentatively, I suggest the following. Perceptually-guided 
interaction is attentive when bodily movements are predominantly 
aligned toward a particular object of perception. It is endogenously 
controlled when we cannot easily predict changes in the subject’s 
motor behaviour using facts about her environment, but must make 
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use of facts about her internal states and/or the ways these have been 
shaped by historical sensorimotor interactions. Finally, whereas 
adaptedness to SMCs can be ascribed on the basis of regularities 
present in the subject’s sensorimotor coupling with the environment 
occurring over varying timescales, cognitively controlled action can 
be distinguished, accounting for the fact that it is better planned, by 
regularities present only over longer timescales. 
If we adopt this view, we will find that cognitive control, and so 
perceptual consciousness, comes in degrees. It may on this basis be 
appropriate to attribute the absent-minded driver, and non-linguistic 
creatures, degrees of consciousness in line with the extent to which 
their interactions (or dispositions to interact) exhibit the above 
characteristics. 
6. 
Now that we have a line of response to the easy-absolute problem, 
let’s consider some further challenges, beginning with the hard-
absolute problem. To solve this problem, we must cast doubt on 
Chalmers’ (1996) claim that there is a conceivable and therefore meta-
physically possible world in which a ‘zombie’ exercises the cognitive 
capacities that in this world give rise to consciousness, but for whom 
there is nothing it is like to do so. 
Myin (2016), endorsing a sensorimotor view of consciousness, 
claims that the phenomenal and the physical are two different per-
spectives one can take on the same bodily doing. To explain why con-
sciousness seems distinct from bodily doing, he appeals to Merleau-
Ponty’s (1945/2013) distinction between the objective and the ‘lived’. 
If you grasp one of your own hands with the other, Merleau-Ponty 
observed, you can either experience the grasped hand as if it were an 
external object or you can experience it as part of your own body (the 
lived), but you can never experience it in both ways simultaneously. If 
consciousness is itself bodily doing, it similarly can either be experi-
enced as something you are doing, or as a bodily activity that is taking 
place, but never in both ways at once. 
This phenomenological distinction supports the idea behind the 
phenomenal concepts strategy (e.g. Loar, 1999), which claims that 
consciousness can appear under distinct phenomenal and physical 
descriptions. By appealing to this difference in how consciousness is 
described, we can explain why zombies are conceivable without 
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needing to concede that they are possible, rendering their possibility 
an unnecessary posit. 
I will venture what I take to be a logical point, namely that what it is 
like to be some x is just what it is to think, perceive, or otherwise 
cognize in the way that x does, described from that x’s point of view. 
By ‘point of view’, I do not mean an experience or other kind of 
mental state, but a way of describing a mental state, for example a 
phenomenal concept, or an experience of something as ‘lived’. To 
attempt to describe the activities of a rock from the rock’s point of 
view would yield an empty description, but this is not because it lacks 
something called a ‘point of view’, but because it is not intentionally 
directed toward the world. I suggest that we cannot resist allowing that 
purported zombies have minds, since by any theory of cognition they 
have the same cognitive capacities we do. If a purported zombie 
perceives and thinks, and we describe this from its point of view, we 
will also necessarily arrive at a non-empty description. So zombies are 
metaphysically impossible. 
Those who claim that zombies are possible will object that this begs 
the question, since they intuit that the idea of describing a creature’s 
point of view is only coherent if that creature possesses a special 
property known as ‘consciousness’, and it is the metaphysical possi-
bility of purely physical creatures being conscious that the zombie 
intuition calls into doubt. What I am trying to make compelling, how-
ever, is a competing intuition in which the order of explanation is 
reversed. The possibility of a physical thing’s being conscious is 
logically derived from the possibility of describing its minded 
activities from its own point of view, and this descriptive stance is 
available in all possible worlds. 
6.1. 
This response to the hard-absolute problem has a bearing on how I 
will now respond to two related worries about the response I have 
given to the easy-absolute problem, firstly that it is too vague, and 
secondly that consciousness might occur, as Block (1995) claims, in 
the absence of cognitive access. 
The upshot of section §5.4 was that perceptual interactions, when 
transformed by linguistic ones, are certainly sufficient for phenomenal 
consciousness. But I claimed that certain non-linguistic cognitive 
capacities may also be sufficient for a kind of phenomenal conscious-
ness, the case for this being uncertain. The worry that this is 
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unacceptably vague loses its edge if we consider the task of explaining 
consciousness to be, in part, what O’Regan (2016) calls a ‘definitional 
enterprise’. He says: 
The task of the sensorimotor approach is to find out what is particular 
about those ways of acting or interacting that people designate as 
‘conscious’ ways. The task is a task of being precise about definitions: 
what capacities to act do we want to call cases of acting consciously?… 
[W]e shall see that once we are precise about definitions, the task of 
‘explaining’ consciousness melts away. Thus a better formulation of the 
question ‘What makes an experience conscious?’ would be: ‘What do 
we mean when we say that a person is experiencing something con-
sciously?’ and ‘What do we designate as conscious ways of behaving?’ 
(ibid., pp. 44–5) 
This understanding does not make the need to identify consciousness 
with certain capacities melt away, but it does make the problem con-
siderably less pressing, rendering the task a question of deciding 
which capacities it is theoretically the most productive to identify with 
consciousness, rather than one of uncovering the hidden essence of 
certain physical or cognitive states. 
The suggestion that explaining consciousness is a matter of deciding 
how to define ‘consciousness’ will to many be unappealing. This is 
because consciousness is often conceived of as a ‘what it is like-ness’ 
that is hard or impossible to define, but with which we are directly and 
intimately acquainted. If this is our conception, we will only assent to 
identifying consciousness with behaviour if this identity turns out to 
be a previously hidden fact about the essential nature of consciousness 
which we have now discovered; we will not accept this identity as a 
matter of stipulation. In line with the standard ‘what it is like-ness’ 
conception, it is therefore easy to read O’Regan as being an outright 
denialist about consciousness. 
I believe that consciousness is perfectly real, yet O’Regan is correct 
that accounting for consciousness is in part a definitional enterprise. 
Consider again the claim that the answer to ‘what is it like to be an x?’ 
will always be ‘what it is it to cognize as an x does, described from an 
x’s point of view’. The problem is that an x’s cognition, when 
described from that x’s point of view, will not necessarily deserve to 
be labelled as ‘conscious’. Deciding which capacities constitute con-
sciousness is the challenge posed not by the hard-absolute problem but 
the easy-absolute problem, and it is in our response to this problem 
that we should take explaining consciousness to be a definitional 
enterprise. 
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A rock, having no cognitive capacities, is not conscious. A person 
who perceives while thinking about and reporting what she perceives 
is certainly conscious. Block claims that the ability to think about 
what you see may merely be an ability to detect consciousness rather 
than a part of what it is to possess phenomenal consciousness. How-
ever, the possibility that thought and language is merely a way to 
detect consciousness is only compelling if you deny that there is any 
difference between what it is like to perceive while thinking about 
what you perceive and what it is like just to perceive. On the proposal 
I am recommending, thinking is a transformation of the whole 
embodied perceiver’s perceptually-guided interaction rather than a 
distinct process. There is no reason to doubt, in view of this, that 
thinking about what you perceive while you perceive it makes a 
difference to one’s perceptual consciousness rather than merely 
serving as a way to measure it. 
It is harder to decide whether cases of perceptually-guided action 
such as driving in the absence of capacities for thought and language, 
with or without cognitive control, are cases of consciousness, because 
they exist somewhere in the middle of a continuum. Just as deciding 
whether viruses are alive will depend on what we take to be the most 
useful way to define ‘life’, deciding whether these cases instantiate 
consciousness will depend on what we take to be the most useful way 
of defining ‘consciousness’. This does not mean that the existence of 
consciousness is under dispute. 
To resolve the question of whether such in-between cases should be 
described as conscious, we might attempt to form some intuition. The 
difficulty is that, whenever we think about our own conscious experi-
ences, they are always the kind transformed by thought. Even if it 
were possible to simulate in one’s imagination the mind of a perceiver 
who cannot think about what she sees, one could not think about what 
this was like without transforming the imagined act. So we cannot use 
introspection to think about unaccessed experience and make an 
intuitive judgment about whether to call this conscious. Block will 
claim that the absent-minded driver, though lacking conscious access 
to what she perceives, perceives in a phenomenally conscious way. 
But the obstacle that prevents us from forming an intuition about 
whether absent-minded driving deserves to be described as conscious 
is one that applies precisely to the question of whether the driver is 
phenomenally conscious. 
In the absence of intuition, a better approach to determining whether 
subjects who do not integrate their perceptual activity with thought 
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) Im
pri
nt 
Ac
ad
em
ic 
20
18
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
-- 
no
t f
or
 re
pr
od
uc
tio
n
  SENSORIMOTOR  THEORY 211 
and language are conscious is whether it is theoretically productive to 
think of them as conscious. It is agreed, in any case, that a subject who 
perceives and acts has cognitive capacities the exercise of which can 
be described from the subject’s point of view. With this established, it 
is hard to see what value is added by insisting that the exercise of 
these capacities, in the absence of cognitive access, deserves to be 
described as conscious. A particular worry is that describing them as 
such leaves open the possibility of mistaking consciousness for a 
distinct property or thing that exists in addition to perception and 
action. 
There is a stronger although not unassailable case for taking 
perception that is integrated with cognitive control but not thought and 
language to be conscious. The drawback with this position is that, as 
just explained, it is impossible to form an intuition based on intro-
spection about whether such episodes deserve to be described as con-
scious. Its advantage, however, is that it does justice to the possibility 
of perception and action occurring unconsciously, while also doing 
justice to the continuities between the cognitive capacities of linguistic 
and non-linguistic creatures. For now I merely want to emphasize that 
deciding how much integration with higher cognitive capacities is 
required to make perception conscious is, if my suggestion is correct, 
a matter of deciding what will allow us to make the most theoretically 
useful distinctions rather than one of closing an explanatory gap. 
6.2. 
Consider an advantage of the present view. We have already seen that 
the sensorimotor approach has the advantage of avoiding the repre-
sentationalist’s (including higher-order theorist’s) dependence on 
neurally-borne content. This is necessary in order to adequately 
respond to the easy problem. The present approach also has an 
advantage over representationalism in its response to the hard prob-
lem. One notable feature of the representationalist family of theories is 
the degree of hair-splitting and increasingly fine distinctions offered 
by one version of the approach to solve problems with another. 
Although they all agree that consciousness is identical to a kind of 
mental representation, they disagree on many technical points: does 
consciousness depend on a single representation (Tye, 2000), and does 
this representation need in part to represent itself (Kriegel, 2009)? Or 
does consciousness instead depend on having a higher-order repre-
sentation of a lower-order representation, and if so, does 
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consciousness consist in the relation between the higher- and lower-
order representations, or just in the higher-order representation 
(Brown, 2015)? 
These distinctions are often motivated by empirical facts about what 
conscious phenomenology is actually like (ibid.), and the question of 
what sorts of mental states or activities subjects such as humans 
actually undergo is certainly an interesting one. The problem is with 
using this to solve the hard problem, since one wonders why one 
particular sort of representation or set of representations should be 
endowed with ‘what it is like-ness’ and not some other. Whichever 
physically realized representational features we propose as candidates 
for consciousness, it seems possible to conceive of them existing with-
out phenomenal consciousness. My proposal avoids this problem, 
because it appeals to points of view to respond to the hard problem, 
and to cognitive capacities to solve the easy problem. This means we 
only need to show that the cognitive capacities we identify with con-
sciousness are usefully identified with consciousness, not that they 
suffice to close an explanatory gap. 
7. 
The sensorimotor approach has already brought empirically supported 
explanatory returns when it comes to making the phenomenal 
character of perceptual consciousness intelligible. We have seen that, 
with some further argumentative steps, its account for phenomenal 
qualities usefully addresses not only the easy-comparative problem, 
but also the hard-comparative problem of explaining how phenomenal 
qualities can be physical at all. The advantages of the sensorimotor 
approach in this domain support the view that consciousness can in 
general be made more intelligible by understanding it as an attribute 
of the whole embodied subject’s way of interacting with the world 
rather than a kind of neural process. Hence I have attempted here to 
apply a sensorimotor approach to the ‘absolute’ question of why we 
are in the first place phenomenally conscious of what we perceive, 
treating the problem as one of explaining what distinguishes the 
conscious from the absent-minded driver. 
Building on O’Regan’s claim that perceptual consciousness consists 
of perceiving while having cognitive access to what one perceives, I 
have emphasized that, in line with what ought to be construed as the 
sensorimotor theory’s basic principles, cognitive access should itself 
be identified with a readiness to engage in certain kinds of skilful 
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interaction, rather than with brain activity as it more commonly is. 
This interaction plausibly consists, in particular, of the kind of learnt 
and recursive communication described by Maturana and Varela, or 
an internally-realized extension of the same activity. This offers a 
robust criterion for meaningful language and thought, and so cognitive 
access, without needing to make appeals to neurobiology that them-
selves do nothing to make consciousness or intentionality more 
explicable. We might also decide that less sophisticated kinds of 
cognitively-driven interaction, when integrated with perception, are 
sufficient for a more basic kind of perceptual consciousness: this will 
depend on what we decide is the most theoretically productive way to 
define ‘consciousness’. 
The treatment of the task as a ‘definitional’ enterprise may seem at 
odds with the idea that consciousness is a matter of there being 
‘something it is like’, since the question of what if anything it is like 
to be some creature is often thought to be a question about how things 
are, not a matter of arriving at a useful definition. I have suggested, in 
response to the hard-absolute problem, that what it is like to be some 
creature is just what it is to cognize in the way the creature does, 
described from that creature’s point of view. The limitation with this 
proposal is that there is no guarantee that a creature’s cognition, 
described from its point of view, will be of a kind we would assent to 
describing as phenomenally conscious. To distinguish the conscious 
driver from the absent-minded and so plausibly non-conscious one, I 
suggest therefore that we appeal to the sorts of skilful interaction I 
have described. 
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